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Nighttime kill and capture operations (“night raids”) by international military have been 
one of the most controversial tactics in Afghanistan. They are as valued by the 
international military as they are reviled by Afghan communities. Night raids have been 
associated with the death, injury, and detention of civilians, and have sparked enormous 
backlash among Afghan communities. The Afghan government and the Afghan public 
have repeatedly called for an end to night raids. International military say they have 
addressed many of the past concerns with night raids, including improved intelligence 
and conduct. They argue that night raids are a way to reduce civilian casualties and are an 
essential part of their military strategy.  
 
The Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office published an in depth study of 
night raids in February 2010.
1
 Since that time, some night raids practices have improved, 
but the overall number of night raids has multiplied, bringing this divisive practice into 
more Afghan homes.
2
 This policy paper will summarize the impact of these changes from 
both a human rights and a policy perspective.  
 
Increased night raids spark backlash  
 
The number of night raids has skyrocketed: publicly available statistics suggest a five-
fold increase between February 2009 and December 2010.
3
 International military 
conducted, on average, 19 night raids per night—a total of 1700 night raids—in the three-
month period from roughly December 2010 to February 2011, according to the NATO-
led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
4
 ISAF has not released more up-to-
date figures; however, interviews conducted for this report suggest a continuing trend of 
large numbers of night raids, possibly at even higher rates. In April 2011, a senior U.S. 
military advisor told the Open Society Foundations that as many as 40 raids might take 




International military officials argue that the increase in night raids has been their most 
successful strategy in the last year, although they have offered no evidence to support 
these claims. They argue that absent the ability to continue night raids, insurgent attacks 
would increase significantly. However, these touted gains have come at a high cost. The 
escalation in raids has taken the battlefield more directly into Afghan homes, sparking 
tremendous backlash among the Afghan population. The Afghan government calls the 
raids counter-productive to reconciliation efforts with insurgent groups, and a threat to 
Afghan sovereignty, given the limited Afghan control of night raids.  Complaints over 
night raids have marred Afghan relations with international partners, particularly the 
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Impact of the tactical directives and other policy reforms 
 
ISAF has repeatedly rejected demands by the Afghan government and public to reduce or 
cease night raids altogether, and instead has focused on addressing some of the most 
common complaints about night raids practices. ISAF has issued two night raids tactical 
directives since the beginning of 2010, as well as other operational guidance. This 
guidance has resulted in significant improvements including reduced risk of civilian 
casualties, greater accuracy in selecting targets, reduced property damage, increased use 
of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and more respectful treatment of women.  
 
However, many of these improvements have been undermined or overshadowed by the 
surge in night raids. Although intelligence improvements have reduced mistaken night 
raids on civilian homes, the increased number and scope of night raids put many more 
civilians at risk than past intelligence flaws ever did. Many more activities may lead 
individuals to be detained in night raids, including the provision of food or shelter (under 
duress or not). In many cases, non-combatants appear to be subjected to night raids due to 
their proximity to insurgent activities, or incidental information about insurgent groups, 
rather than due to their actual conduct or status.  As a result, far more non-combatants are 
detained in a year. Though the majority of non-combatants are soon released, the 
experience may result in lasting physical, financial, and emotional harm. International 
military typically release individuals by first handing them over to Afghan custody, 
where they can suffer poor conditions or even abuse rising to the level of torture. 
 
In addition, although civilian casualties have been reduced significantly, they still occur, 
many as a result of mistaken interpretations of “hostile intent.” Further, the increase in 
the number of raids has not been matched by strengthened accountability or redress 
mechanisms, such that when wrongful or mistaken detention or civilian casualties do 
occur, there is often no meaningful response by ISAF. The lack of transparency or strong 
accountability mechanisms have reinforced Afghan perceptions that  international 
military use night raids to kill, harass, and intimidate civilians with impunity.   
 
Finally, ISAF has made significant efforts to try to satisfy 1) Afghan government 
complaints about not having control over night raids, and 2) Afghan community requests 
that international forces take greater account of cultural sensitivities about women’s 
privacy. However, these reforms have done little to alter Afghan opposition to night 
raids. In some cases, this is because the measures were under-implemented or did not go 
far enough. The larger failing, though, has been that these reforms are an inadequate 
substitute for Afghans’ demands that night raids be significantly reduced, if not halted 
altogether: demands that are regularly echoed by the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai.  
 
Are night raids worth it?  
 
Without more transparency or supporting evidence, it is difficult to balance the purported 
benefits of night raids with their very real and obvious costs. What is clear, however, is 
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that tactical and operational tweaks to night raids practices are not enough to counter 
dissatisfaction with the practice as a whole. Although significant improvements have 
been made in the conduct of night raids, public recognition of these improvements has 
been overshadowed by mounting anger over the higher number of raids. Given the 
extreme opposition by both the Afghan public and the Afghan administration, the current 
pace of night raids is not sustainable. While militant extremist groups pose an enormous 
threat to human rights and security in Afghanistan, the human, political, and strategic 
costs illustrated by this policy review raise questions about whether over-reliance on 
night raids is the most effective long-term strategy for effectively countering militancy. 
  
Recommendations to ISAF and U.S. Forces 
 
1. Cease raids that do not discriminate between combatants and civilians; ensure that 
night raids, which are military operations, are only used against combatants or 
civilians directly participating in hostilities.  
2. Ensure that night operations—in particular mass detention operations at night—
target individuals based on their presumed status as a combatant, rather than 
based on their age, gender, nationality, ethnicity, tribal affiliation, or the 
geographic area in which they live.  
3. Ensure night raids and other night-time military operations are not used as 
substitutes for criminal proceedings or other methods of intelligence gathering. 
Ensure that operations that aim to detain non-combatants adhere to law 
enforcement standards governing the use of force. 
4. Implement tactical directive guidance to consider alternative methods of detention 
wherever possible.  Detentions that adhere to regular law enforcement practices 
are preferred in areas where there is strong government control, or other areas in 
which Afghan partners have strong capacity to conduct more regular law 
enforcement detentions.  
5. Continue to enforce existing guidance on night raids that have resulted in reduced 
civilian casualties and improved conduct.  
6. Improve outreach and consultation with local communities to the extent possible, 
before and after night raids.  
7. Improve transparency over the criteria for when night raids may be used (as 
opposed to other means of detention) and over the conduct of night raids 
themselves. Reinforce accountability measures, including ways for families to 
find out information about those detained, and the status of investigations into 
allegations of civilian casualties. 
8. Improve compensation standards and procedures with regard to night raids, 
including compensation for wrongful detention.  
9. Work with ANSF to improve their conduct and accountability, in particular with 
Afghan Special Forces, whose role in night raids may become more prominent 
after transition. 
10. Ensure that Afghan militias or other irregular forces are not used in night raids 
given their lack of mandate, weak accountability, and history of abuse.  
 
* * * 
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The use of night raids has reached a critical juncture in Afghanistan. Long unpopular 
with Afghan communities, a dramatic upsurge in night raids in the last year has brought 
Afghan anger on this issue to a boiling point. Public demonstrations, often large and 
violent, are a common occurrence following night raids that have resulted in alleged 
civilian harm. For example, following a night raid in Takhar province in May 2011 that 
killed four, more than 2000 Afghans engaged in a multi-day protest, including an attempt 




Night raids are viewed with such hostility that even one night raid in an area can be 
enough to undo other trust-building efforts.  A separate study by the Open Society 
Foundations found that night raids play a big role in engendering Afghan hostility toward 
international forces.
8
  The study also found that anger over night raids obscures overall 
recognition that ISAF and U.S. forces have made efforts to reduce civilian casualties and 
that they are making good faith efforts to improve stability.   
 
Night raids are often viewed as illegitimate, and even criminal in their nature. A recent 
study by The Liaison Office on community policing strategies found that in five of six 
provinces surveyed, citizens named night raids as one of the top crimes facing their 
community.
9
 As one man from Nangarhar, interviewed in research for this policy paper, 
said, “They claim to be against terrorists, but what they are doing is terrorism. It spreads 
terror. It creates more violence.”10  
 
Attitudes like this create a dilemma for international military forces: while they 
understand the unpopularity of night raids and the wider danger of losing public support, 
they see these raids as a central component of their military strategy. They argue that 
night raids are the most effective means of disrupting insurgent networks, with minimal 
risk to troops and low civilian casualties. In addition, night raids can be accomplished 
with few international troops—an important factor given anticipated troop drawdowns.11 
As a result, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has rejected 
calls by some (including the Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office) to 
eliminate or reduce night raids, and instead has focused on tactical and operational 
changes that might address the most frequent complaints. This policy paper will analyze 
the effectiveness of that response strategy.  
Over the past year and a half, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has 
taken a number of steps to modify or curb some night raid practices. Key tactical 
guidance that has influenced night raids policy since the February 2010 report by the 
Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office include the following: 
 
 A tactical directive specific to night raids issued in January 2010, with an 
unclassified version released in February 2010;
12
  
 A update to an existing tactical directive on reducing civilian casualties, issued in 
August 2010 (no unclassified version released) 
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 An update to the tactical directive on reducing civilian casualties, issued in July 
2011 (no unclassified version released). 
  
These updates and directives have been reinforced by other guidance and operating 
procedures that have been periodically disseminated to troops. Another tactical directive 
specific to night raids is anticipated shortly. 
 
Using the February 2010 Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office report on 
night raids as a baseline,
14
 this policy paper will assess the success of these reforms, 
within the context of the overall increase in night raids. This paper is intended as a policy 
analysis, not a survey study. However, analysis in this report has been informed by the 
initial 2009 and 2010 research carried out for the February Open Society Foundations and 
The Liaison Office study on night raids; regular monitoring of policy changes and select 
incidents by the Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office; regular consultation 
with military officials on their policies and practices; and a small sampling of case studies 
of recent incidents. Between October 2010 and July 2011, 77 interviews were conducted 
with Afghan community elders, witnesses, and victims of night raids in Nangarhar, 
Kandahar, Paktia, Uruzgan, Kunduz, Kunar, Helmand, and Laghman provinces.  In 
addition to regular meetings with international military as part of regular monitoring of 
night raids cases, nine interviews were conducted with international military officials, 
advisors, or consultants involved in the planning, operations, or investigation of night 
raids officials.  Additionally, eight interviews were conducted with other international 
and Afghan independent monitors.  
 
This paper will proceed in three parts. The first part will examine how changes since the 
last report have impacted the accuracy and lawfulness of target selection for night raids. 
The second part will examine efforts to address complaints about civilian harm, including 
reductions in civilian casualties, persistent risk factors of civilian harm, and the 
effectiveness of accountability measures. The final section will assess U.S. and ISAF 
efforts to respond to broader Afghan policy concerns that night raids be minimized or 
halted; that where night raids occur the Afghan government have greater control; and that 
Afghan cultural and religious sensitivities are respected.  
Target Selection 
In their previous night raids report, the Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office  
noted frequent Afghan complaints that night raids were inaccurate, resulting in the use of 
night raids on innocent civilians’ homes. One notable improvement since that time has 
been fewer reports of mistaken targeting. Many Afghans interviewed said night raids are 
largely getting insurgents.  
 
Despite this extremely positive step, Afghans still tended to argue that night raids impact 
many innocent people. This is likely because ISAF efforts to increase night raids and to 
“widen the net” around insurgents has led to broader targeting strategies, with the result 
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that many non-combatants with only tangential connections to insurgents are subject to 
night raids, and detained. In addition, indiscriminate detention practices, such as arresting 
all fighting-aged males present in a house, and large-scale, on-site detentions of all males 
in a village, have undermined ISAF’s efforts to portray night raids as precise, narrowly 
targeted operations based on accurate intelligence. 
A. Intelligence and targeting of night raids has improved overall 
Accuracy of intelligence and targeting—previously a major complaint—has improved in 
the last year.  ISAF now claims that they get their target in 8 out of 10 raids.
15
  Though no 
statistics about the accuracy of raids in years past are available, independent monitors and 
analysts, who examine cases to determine whether those raided are civilians or 
combatants, have noted anecdotal improvements in the accuracy of night raids.  In an 
interview published in May 2011, President Karzai’s chief of staff, Mohammed Daudzai, 
noted that better coordination with Afghan officials has indeed reduced “mistakes” and 




This improved accuracy is likely most due to the greater availability of surveillance 
planes, helicopter support units, and listening devices, including intelligence assets 
previously allocated to Iraq.
17
 The increase in troops throughout 2010, both conventional 
and special operations forces, is also said to have “disrupted” insurgents’ movements and 





Anecdotal evidence collected by the Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office  
suggest communities have begun to recognize the improvements in accuracy.
19
  Despite 
being wrongfully targeted himself, a landowner from the Mirwais Mina district of 
Kandahar city acknowledged the overall improved accuracy of raids. “I think most of the 
night raids [targeted homes] where the Taliban were present,” he said. “But sometimes 
they killed ordinary people too.”20 Other interviewees whose homes were raided often 
admitted there was a basis for the raid, such as having had a house guest of unknown 
(potentially insurgent) affiliation in their homes, having a distant family staying with 
them who voiced anti-government sentiments, having recently provided food or shelter to 
Taliban (many civilians report being coerced into providing such assistance), or having 
spoken with insurgents in days or weeks prior to the raid.  
B. Despite improvements, mistakes still occur 
Although there may have been improvements in the quality of intelligence leading to 
raids, mistakes still occur. ISAF notes that in 20 percent of the raids, it does not get who 
it was after. This could be because the individual escaped before forces arrived at the 




There have been a number of prominent civilian casualty incidents resulting from night 
raids that appear to have been due to false information.
22
 For example, on May 12, 2011, 
an Afghan National Policeman (ANP) and his 12-year-old niece were killed when the 
ANP officer’s home was mistakenly targeted.23 In December 2010, a father and adult son 
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were killed in Surkhrod district, Nangarhar province, in what the family claims was a 
case of mistaken identity (ISAF has neither admitted that the raid was mis-targeted, nor 
offered evidence otherwise).
24
 In the same incident, a second son was abused at point of 
capture, and then detained for a day and a night before being released without charge and 
being told that the entire incident was a mistake by the official who interrogated him. 
 
Though efforts to improve intelligence gathering and vetting may help prevent these 
mistakes, some may be inevitable given the sheer number and pace of raids. Effective 
transparency and accountability mechanisms are crucial for allowing civilians to voice  
concerns when they arise. 
C. Broader targeting threshold results in frequent detention of civilians 
While civilians were often able to offer a reason that explained why they were targeted, 
that does not necessarily mean the raid was lawful. With the pressure to step up night 
raids, the range of activities that might lead an Afghan to be targeted has increased.
 
One 
former State department official observed: “Commanders are under pressure to find 
targets for these raids, because it has become a metric of success.”25 Perhaps as a 
consequence, night raids have frequently resulted in the detention of those who are not 
combatants under international law, with those suspected of providing shelter or food, or 
having incidental information about insurgent activities subjected to night raids. Night 
raids indiscriminately target innocent “bystanders” who are not “directly participating in 
hostilities.” 
1. Night raids target those who provide food or shelter 
In several cases, civilians have complained that they were targeted for a night raid 
because they had given food or shelter to the Taliban or other insurgents (either 
voluntarily or under duress). One 41-year-old landowner from the Mirwais Mina district 
of Kandahar city was detained, along with his brother, son, and other men staying in the 
guesthouse. “[The international forces] told us at the end, ‘You are not Talib but you 
have links with Taliban and every time the Taliban are living in your guesthouse and you 
are giving food and other help.’”26 He was released after a few days.  
 
Another man arrested in Kunduz province in October 2010 said that the Americans who 
arrested him only asked him about his support for the Taliban, and any information he 
had about them: “They said ‘You support the Taliban. You feed and shelter them. For 
this reason we are arresting you and taking you away for more investigation and 
questioning.’”27   
 
Insurgents frequently use civilian homes as a source of food and shelter, a practice which 
likely increased as the international military troop levels rose and the pressure on 
insurgent hideouts grew. International forces are aware of this phenomenon, but troops 
still tend to arrest all fighting aged males present in these homes even when military 
officials do not suspect all of the men of being insurgents. International military officials 
interviewed on this subject said that even if an individual is not the target of a raid, he 
may still be detained because his involvement in the insurgency is not always clear until 
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questioned and his information checked out.
28
 Military officials involved in operational 
aspects of night raids said that even if that man is known to be a civilian, he will still be 
detained because he may know valuable information about those captured or other 
aspects of the insurgency, and would possibly be more willing to divulge such 




Many of those who said they were detained for questioning because they gave food or 
shelter to insurgents said they had no choice given the power of Taliban in their region. 
“For sure 95 percent of the people give food to the Taliban. Everyone gives food because 
the Taliban are powerful. They go to different people’s houses all the time. Sometimes 
they tell you before they come, and sometimes they just show up,” said a man detained in 




A man from the Ghorak district of Kandahar who was held 10 days after being detained 
during a night raid said, “I can tell you, our entire district is controlled by the Taliban. 
There is no government or Americans here. We have to have contacts with the Taliban. 
We go to their courts because we are far from Kandahar city. The Taliban go to homes 
and get lunch and dinner by force. If anyone rejected giving food to them, they would 
face many problems.”31  
 
Many civilians feel caught between both sides. They do not have a choice other than to 
deal with the Taliban but doing so might subject them to night raids.
32
 
2. Night raids target civilians with incidental information 
In some of these cases, civilians may not have been detained because they provided food 
or shelter to insurgents, but because these activities led international forces to conclude 
that they possessed information about insurgent activities, or were insurgents themselves. 
Current patterns of detention suggest many night raids may be heavily (if not primarily) 
motivated by intelligence gathering.  
 
Individuals have been detained or questioned because they have extended family or tribal 
links with insurgents, or because they live in an area suspected of significant insurgent 
activity or popular support. Many of those detained are released after only a few days 
with no further charge, and appear to have, at best, tangential links to insurgent groups. 
The frequency of these complaints raise concerns that civilians are being targeted based 
on mere associations or incidental contact with insurgents, not because they are suspected 




Interviews with military officials and analysts suggest that at least some of these raids 
may be part of a “networking” strategy of targeting key insurgent leaders. As one U.S. 
military officer who had been part of the review and authorization of night raids 
explained: “If you can’t get the guy you want, you get the guy who knows him.”34   
 
Another reason to suspect that some of these raids may be motivated by intelligence 
gathering is the sheer number of raids. One military official involved in night raid 
operations suggested to the Open Society Foundations that there are not enough mid- to 
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high-level Taliban commanders “left” at this point in the war to justify the 20 or more 
night raids in Afghanistan per night (on average). He suggested that most mid- to high-
level commanders who are still alive are probably in Pakistan. The official said that many 
of the current night raids are likely targeting individuals who the military knows are not 
insurgents but who might know something about insurgent activities. This could also 
mean that low level fighters are also now being targeted, which may also raise the 
question of whether there is sufficient military gain, or necessity, to justify the physical 
and mental harm to surrounding civilians. 
 
However, this explanation was contested by other military officials whom the Open 
Society Foundations interviewed. Some military analysts and advisors maintained that 
night raids continue to hit mid- and high-level commanders. They argued that there are 
enough of these commanders “left” because the insurgency is replacing commanders 
quickly, much more quickly, for example, than Afghan security forces can replace their 
troops. As one former military advisor to General Petraeus noted, “Their bench is deeper 
than ours.”35 
3. Large-scale detentions or “clearance” operations more frequent 
Many of those interviewed reported night-time operations that targeted multiple 
compounds, sometimes extending to an entire village.
36
 For example, in October 2010, 
U.S. Special Forces and the Afghan National Army (ANA) conducted a large-scale night-
time operation that resulted in the detention of 80 to 100 individuals in Otmanzey village, 
in Qul Tapa district, in Kunduz province. The Open Society Foundations interviewed 
several adult males detained in the raid, whose testimony may be characterized as 
follows:
37
   
 
Adult male members of households were taken into custody, their hands bound, 
and brought to the village mosque. An estimated 80 to 100 men and boys were 
detained in the mosque from approximately 8pm until 3am the next day. A 
number of techniques were used to select individuals for further questioning at a 
nearby Special Operations base or temporary/transit facility. A masked informant 
pointed out individuals using a thumbs up/thumbs down to indicate who among 
the crowd would be detained for further questioning. Having a beard or worn 
shoulders (indicating that the individual carried weapons) or non-calloused hands 
(indicating that the individual was not regularly engaged in farming) were also 
used to select individuals for further detention.
 
Fifteen persons were eventually 
taken to the U.S. base for further questioning as a result of this selection process. 
All were eventually released.  
 
Local government leaders said that similar operations involving large-scale detentions 




Other night-time operations that have resulted in the mass detention of individuals have 





independent monitors. For example:  
 
 In October 2010, ISAF and ANSF forces allegedly entered the village of 
Mushan, in Panjwai district, Kandahar province, at night. They separated the men 
from the women and collected the men (approximately 50 to 60) in one house 
and continued questioning them over a 24 hour period, alleging that those in the 
village were supporting Taliban fighters. Some of the men were taken away to 




 According to UNAMA/AIHRC reporting, ISAF and ANSF conducted a search 
and seizure operation in December 2010 in Shah Wali Kot village in Kandahar 
province, gathering approximately 100 men and boys into one location for on-site 
detention for two days.
40
 UNAMA and AIHRC reported similar on-site 
questioning of 30 men in Tangai village, Kandahar province at approximately the 
same time.  
 
Civilians tend to report these large-scale detentions as “night raids”; however, in many 
cases what is reported as a large-scale night raid is referred to by the military as a 
“clearance” operation. Night raids are primarily targeted operations, based on specific 
intelligence of suspect activity or material. In contrast, clearance operations are often 
used when international military do not have specific enough intelligence for a night raid, 
and instead are using the operation to identify the suspected combatant or combatant 
activity. For example, international military may believe that insurgents frequent a 
particular village or area, or use a village as a base for bomb-making or other combatant 
activities, but do not know which individuals or houses in the village are involved.   So 
instead of a targeted raid, they engage in a clearance operation and conduct a more 
general search of the entire village or area. They surround the town, cutting off potential 
exit and entry points, and send a large number of troops to conduct house-to-house 
searches and questioning. Clearing operations can last from a number of hours to a 




The semantics of whether an operation at night time is a night raid or a clearing operation 
matters less than the level of intelligence upon which it is based, and the degree to which 
that intelligence (or lack thereof) leads to the indiscriminate detention of non-combatants. 
The more general the intelligence, the more serious the deprivation of rights, and the 
more indiscriminate the operation is, the more likely an operation would be to raise legal 
flags, and also the ire of Afghan communities. In many cases, clearance operations may 
be based on less specific intelligence, and be less discriminating in whom they target. It is 
also not clear whether the improved provisions in the tactical directives specific to night 
raids apply when the military considers an operation to be a clearance operation.  
4. Legal concerns: increased night raids risk targeting civilians and indiscriminate 
detention 
a) Raids should target combatants or those “directly participating in hostilities” 
The practices described above suggest that international forces may be using an 
overbroad definition of combatancy or “direct participation in hostilities” (DPH), 
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resulting in the targeting of civilians who should be protected from attack under 
international law. 
 
Because of the kind and degree of force typically used in night raids in Afghanistan, as 
well as the foreseeability of civilian harm and property destruction, night raids generally 
constitute attacks under international law. International forces consider night raids to be 
uses of military force—not police actions—and therefore subject to international 
humanitarian law (IHL). While IHL permits international forces greater latitude in the 
use of lethal force than in police actions, the principle of distinction prohibits directing 
attacks against civilians or civilian objects. In the context of night raids, this means 
international forces should typically conduct such operations only against legitimate 
military targets—combatants, or civilians who are directly participating in hostilities.42  
 
In some cases, international forces may wish to question or detain non-combatant 
civilians through night raids. While few would dispute that individuals, including 
civilians, may be questioned about criminal or insurgent activities, it is important that the 
means chosen for questioning are necessary, and sufficiently protective of civilian life.
43
  
The kind and degree of military force used in night raids, particularly the permissive use 
of lethal force authorized in the military’s rules of engagement (ROEs), will almost 
always be unnecessary to detain civilians not physically threatening international forces 
or otherwise directly participating in hostilities. Instead, international forces should detain 
such individuals through alternative, less harmful means, characterized by law 
enforcement standards and limits on the use of force. 
 
There are ongoing debates about the precise definition of a civilian directly participating 
in hostilities, however, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and other 
international legal authorities have concluded that DPH requires acts that directly cause 
adverse military affects such as death, injury, or property destruction.
44
 Under this 
standard, many acts that may contribute to a general war effort, such as political, 
financial, or propaganda support, are simply too distantly related to the conduct of 
hostilities to qualify as DPH.   
 
Civilians who merely possess intelligence or provide support such as shelter and food are 
not directly participating in hostilities. Under international law, they are protected from 
attack and cannot be targeted by military operations, including night raids.  
 
Many civilians report being effectively coerced into providing assistance, which is even 
further reason not to consider such conduct DPH. In such circumstances assistance is akin 
to self-defense and should not be a basis for depriving civilians of their protected status.
45
   
 
Even acts that are criminalized under Afghan law, such as providing financial or other 
material support to militants, may not rise to the level of DPH.  In such circumstances, 
military force may not be used as a substitute for criminal proceedings and any efforts to 







Though detaining civilians who may have incidentally acquired information about 
insurgent forces or their activities no doubt provides important military value, mere 
possession of valuable intelligence does not constitute direct participation in hostilities, 
transforming a civilian into a legal target. Nor should the passive possession of 
information, even if related to insurgent activities, constitute an “act” that directly causes 
adverse military effects and thus DPH.
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 Those who possessed such information, absent 
other combatant activities, would still be civilians. Targeting them with a military 
operation would be unlawful.   
 
Interviews with military officials and civilians suggest that in many cases, intelligence 
gathering may be a purpose of the raid, but not the sole one. However, given the lack of 
transparency over the authorization and conduct of night raids, it is difficult to assess 
whether and how often this line is crossed from intelligence as the secondary objective to 
the sole basis for targeting. The fact that so many detentions resulting from night raids or 
clearance operations appear to be used against those with only tangential or informational 
links to the insurgency raises concerns that international forces are using military force to 
detain civilians not based on their participation in hostilities but solely to gather 
intelligence. In such circumstance, alternative, less harmful means should be employed to 
question or affect any detention, characterized by law enforcement standards and limits 
on the use of force. 
b) Large-scale detentions risk arbitrary detentions, perceived as collective punishment 
In addition to the above DPH concerns, large-scale detention or clearing operations raise 
further concerns about arbitrary detention. Individuals may be detained incidentally as 
part of a broader operation, often as a matter of military necessity. But operations that 
deliberately target and round up civilians not themselves suspected of DPH or being 
security threats, but only in order to subject them to interrogation and screening may 
constitute an arbitrary deprivation of liberty and constitute inhumane treatment in 




Under international law, detentions must be made on an individualized basis and may not 
be imposed as collective punishment or based on arbitrary or discriminatory grounds.
49
 
Detaining civilians simply because they live in a particular area or are of a certain age, 
gender, nationality, or ethnicity may be arbitrary or even discriminatory detention in 
violation of Common Article 3, which expressly requires humane treatment of civilians 
without any “adverse distinction” including difference of treatment based on race, 
religion, birth, or other similar criteria.
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5. Broader targeting limits recognition of other positive reforms 
This broad targeting has limited positive recognition of the improved accuracy of raids, 
and increased negative perceptions of night raids. Though many interviewees would give 
examples of houses that were accurately targeted (because insurgents were present or 
passing through at the time), they remained angry that all men present in the home would 





To illustrate this point, one man from Nangarhar province gave an example of a night 
raid in the Sherzad district in late 2010 that he said resulted in the death of a number of 
civilians in addition to the targeted Taliban commander:  “[ISAF] definitely had a report 
[accurate tip] because this guy was an insurgent—it was accurate information. But 50 
percent of those in the house were civilians. It was this other [civilian] guy’s house, not 
Mullah Daoud’s. He was forced to take [the Taliban] in.”51Afghan complaints often 
center on the indiscriminate nature of these raids: “If I commit a crime, then they should 
take issue with me. There is no need to disturb my mother, my sister, my child.”52  
 
Most of the time, those detained primarily for their information value or because they 
were present in the house when the raid happened (but were not themselves the main 
target), are released within a week of the night raid. When this happens, civilians often 
assume the raid was based on faulty intelligence, undermining international forces’ 
efforts to demonstrate that they take pains to avoid harm to civilians and to ensure that 
their strikes are accurate, and precise. 
 
ISAF efforts to demonstrate that night raids are limited, precision strikes based on high 
levels of intelligence also tend to be undermined by detention practices that appear to be 
indiscriminate, such as detaining and questioning all men in a village during large-scale 
detentions.  
 
More generally, the broader targeting strategies have significantly increased Afghan 
anger at night raids. Communities often see raids as deliberately targeting or harassing 
civilians, in order to discourage communities from providing food and shelter to 
insurgents, or to pressure them to supply intelligence on the insurgency. This causes 
significant resentment given the often lethal consequences of refusing Taliban demands 
for food or shelter. Civilians feel trapped between both sides.  
 
Networking strategies that target on the basis of family or tribal networks may also lead 
to mistargeting, which angers the population with little valuable strategic benefit. Family 
linkages in Afghanistan are vast and complex, and it is dangerous to use them as sole 
grounds for arrests. As one local journalist from Kandahar explained, “Coalition forces 
should stop arresting innocent people from villages because they suspect Taliban 
connections. If that is the [criteria], they might as well arrest all southerners because 
almost all villagers are connected with Taliban in one way or the other. The person who 
is an active Taliban is either my uncle, cousin, or nephew and so on.”53 
Civilian Harm & Accountability 
ISAF argues that night raids result in few civilian casualties, and thus are a way to reduce 
the risk of civilian harm compared with an overall military strategy that relied more 
heavily on traditional, daytime combat activities. At night, troops have the tactical 
advantage of surprise, and with night-vision goggles and other advanced surveillance 
systems, can see more than those being targeted. ISAF claims that these tactical 




of harm to troops or surrounding civilians. In addition, fewer civilians are out and about 




Nonetheless, night raids have long been associated with civilian casualties, mistreatment 
at point of capture or in detention, and property loss. Many of the provisions of ISAF 
tactical directives have attempted to address these criticisms, with a focus on reducing 
civilian casualties. Though many of these provisions have resulted in significant 
improvements, civilian casualties still occur, particularly as a result of misinterpretations 
of Afghan “hostile intent.” In addition, the increase in night raids and the broader 
targeting patterns discussed above mean that thousands of non-combatants are subjected 
to detention every year, often suffering abuse rising to torture in Afghan detention 
facilities, and incurring heavy financial and emotional tolls on them and their families.  
A. Conduct: More restraint, fewer civilian casualties  
Independent monitors, detainees, and witnesses of raids have reported fewer instances of 
death and/or abuse resulting from night raids in 2010 and the first half of 2011. In 2009 
the UN reported that 98 civilians were killed in search and seizure operations (mostly 
night raids), which they stated dropped by 18 percent in 2010.
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 Considering the dramatic 
increase in search and seizure operations, this is significant. However, the UN has also 
stated that it may be underreporting civilian casualties caused by night raids because of 
the difficulty in accessing areas where they take place.
56
 ISAF says that civilian casualties 
occurred in less than 1 percent of night raids in 2010,
57
 and has persistently noted that no 
shots are fired in 80 percent of raids (although no public statistics have been released to 




Some of the provisions in the two ISAF tactical directives paid particular attention to 
limiting property damage at the site of night raids, and better documentation when 
property was taken or damaged in order to provide compensation. While Afghans still 
complain about property damage, they report that damage is often less severe than before. 
For example, there were fewer complaints of dynamiting doors or shooting through the 
roofs of homes, and less damage to surrounding property and animals. There were some 
instances in which individuals were able to recover seized property or receive 
compensation for it, which almost never happened in the past. Compensation for 
damaged items from night raids is however, less frequent than compensation for other 
types of incidents.  
1. Reduced harm also due to Afghan community precautions 
Fewer civilian casualties are attributable not only to greater care taken by ISAF, but also 
to actions taken by Afghan communities. Communities the Open Society Foundations 
and The Liaison Office visited said they had begun to change their behavior to reduce the 
risk of night raids turning violent. For example, an elder from the Khogiani district of 
Nangarhar province, which was the site of many night raids in late 2010, noted, 
“Anybody coming out from the home [during a night raid] is shot, so no one likes to 




Another man from Laghman province said his uncle was wounded by stray shrapnel from 
a night operation on a neighbor’s home. Though his uncle’s wounds were serious, he said 
they dared not go outside to seek medical help, or even turn on any light to try to treat the 
wound because past experience had taught them that they would then be targeted.
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“Around five months ago in Masemud area, first the American troops shot a rocket and 
then—it was around 12 or 1 am—everyone came out from their homes to see what had 
happened and they shot them. So now after that everyone knows when the bombs come 
to stay in their homes…. Now people are familiar with these incidents and they stay in 
the house when Americans arrive.”61 
B. Civilian casualties still occur, often due to mistaken assumptions about 
“hostile intent”  
Despite improvements in accuracy and conduct during raids, they still kill and injure 
civilians. Even with significant efforts to curb the risk to civilians from these raids, with 
the dramatic increase in raids (particularly in the context of insurgent tactics of hiding 
among the population), civilian casualties and mistaken identity will inevitably occur. 
Choosing to detain a suspected combatant at night in a family home almost guarantees 
that other innocent civilians (including women and children) are also present and 
subjected to the military operation. It may also involve nearby community members.   
 
Night raids may create a hostile situation where one would not otherwise exist. It is not 
unusual for Afghan homes to be well armed, and if Afghans think they are being 
attacked, to respond with force. As a result, those who might not otherwise resist arrest or 
respond aggressively if detained during the day might respond in self-defense when 
unknown men assault their house at night, leading themselves or other innocent civilians 
in the home to be killed or injured. On February 12, 2010, U.S. troops killed five 
civilians, including two women, and injured eight others in a raid in Gardez city, Paktia 
province. The raid targeted the home of an Afghan national policeman (ANP), reportedly 
with the intention of detaining a guest who had escaped before the raid. When troops 
arrived, several men of the house including the ANP officer believed they were being 
attacked and ran outside.
62
 International forces responded by opening fire, killing the five 
men as well as two women nearby.  
 
The way that international forces interpret behavior during these hostile engagements 
may also increase the likelihood of civilian harm. The standard U.S. Rules of 
Engagement permit U.S. forces to use lethal force in self-defense against individuals who 
commit hostile acts (for example, firing at troops) or demonstrate hostile intent 
(something less than a direct use of force).  
 
ISAF troops appear to interpret hostile intent too broadly, without sufficient regard for 
the complicated and confused circumstances civilians often find themselves in during 
raids. As a result, the right to use lethal force is too easily triggered, resulting in 
unnecessary and avoidable civilian harm. Behavior that would seem relatively innocuous 
in a less tense situation—for example sleeping near a weapon,63 running away from the 
intruders,
64
 or even merely “stepping out” of a compound during a night raid65—have 
been deemed signs of hostile intent during night raids in Afghanistan, triggering lethal 
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force.  During a March 2010 night raid, an 81-year-old man was deemed to have hostile 
intent for picking up his cell phone while in bed.
66
   
 
C. Non-lethal impacts are increasing, often overlooked 
Discussions of civilian harm during night raids tend to focus on civilian deaths. However, 
it is important to remember that these raids have many serious non-lethal effects. Injuries 
may be under-reported, as they raise less public scrutiny or manifest in severity later.  
 
In addition, the focus on civilian casualties due to night raids should not obscure the harm 
caused by detentions that do not result in death or injury. In the three month period 
ending in February 18, 2011, 1900 individuals were detained, with “not many” left in 
custody at the end of that period.
67
  Some of these rapid releases may have been due to a 
lack of evidence (not a lack of guilt), but it is likely that in many of these cases the 
individuals released within a week were deemed to be non-combatants who posed no 
threat. That there should be a number of these cases seems plausible due to the frequency 
of international forces detaining all males present in a house, detaining mass numbers of 
individuals in clearance operations, and the concerns discussed above that some non-
combatants may be detained for intelligence value.   
 
Though it is positive that those deemed to be non-combatants are quickly identified and 
released, these numbers may suggest that in an effort to increase the sweep of night raids, 
thousands of non-combatants are being detained every year.   Being held in detention can 
be a traumatic experience, whether it is temporarily on-site, or for more prolonged 
periods at international military bases, or for those handed over to Afghan detention 
facilities. Severe mistreatment, including torture, is widespread in detention facilities of 
the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS), and conditions in all Afghan 
facilities are generally poor.
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 Detainees are often not told what charges they are being 
held for or when they will be released. Those detained for even a few days may suffer 
significant financial setbacks, and those handed over to Afghan custody when no charge 
is brought against them often have to pay expensive bribes to be released.  
 
The fear and trauma for those whose family members are detained, or for those who 
witness these raids can also be significant. One 61-year-old man who experienced a night 
raid in his home in April 2010, described how armed men shot his son point blank in the 
chest with “10 or 12 bullets.” He was hooded and corralled into a bathroom with three 
other relatives, with barely room for the three of them to stand up. When they were 
finally let out of the bathroom, they were too afraid to move his dead son’s body, lest 
they be attacked again, so it was left lying on the living room floor until the NDS came to 
investigate the next morning.
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D. Limited progress on accountability and transparency 
The increased number of night raids, with a potential to impact a greater number of non-




mechanisms—issues that ISAF and U.S. forces have been weak on in the past, 
particularly with regard to Special Forces activities.  
 
ISAF has made efforts in the last year to try to address complaints about accountability 
for civilian casualty incidents more generally, including those resulting from night raids. 
ISAF has continued to support the development of a Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell 
since it was created in December 2008, as well as other reporting and investigation 
processes. Incidents that ISAF suspects of resulting in civilian casualties are investigated 
by the Joint Incident Assessment Teams (JIAT), with investigations supervised by a one-
star general or equivalent. Particularly controversial or murky cases may involve a site 
investigation by the JIAT, often undertaken jointly with Afghan government 
counterparts. These primarily involve an assessment of any evidence at the site, 
interviews with those troops involved, and with Afghan local officials.  
 
A Civilian Casualties Working Group was instituted in March 2011 to explore policy 
changes at an operational or tactical level that could better reduce civilian casualties and 
complaints. In the late spring and summer of 2011, ISAF demonstrated greater efforts to 
reach out to international and Afghan civil society by hosting or participating in 
conferences designed to allow civil society to engage with them on civilian casualty 




Though these are positive steps forward, other aspects of accountability have failed to 
improve, or even worsened. ISAF has appeared less responsive to independent monitors 
raising civilian casualty concerns than in the past. For example, ISAF has more often than 
not refused to discuss a number of suspected civilian casualty cases, provide evidence 
that those alleged to be civilians were in fact combatants, share video or other on-site 
evidence (which used to be forthcoming in the past), re-examine initial findings where 




Public accountability also remains poor. Though press releases are often issued 
immediately following an incident, often noting if an investigation into civilian casualties 
is underway, the results of that investigation, or any subsequent information, is typically 
not made publicly available later on.
72
 When press releases announcing that insurgents 
are killed or detained have later been proven wrong, public corrections are rarely issued. 
Civilian casualty totals in the Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell do not always appear to be 
corrected to admit mistakes in initial reporting.
73
 ISAF has not released public versions of 




Accountability issues are particularly weak for night raids because the forces responsible 
for the vast majority of night raids—the Special Forces Task Force Joint Special 
Operations Command (JSOC) (formerly under Admiral William McCraven)—are the 
least transparent of international forces operating in Afghanistan.
75
 As a rule, they do not 
accept interviews or meetings with independent monitors. Despite greater efforts to 
integrate them into ISAF-HQ, these forces report back to the Special Operations 
Command (U.S.SOCOM) based in Tampa, Florida. Despite repeated inquiries, 
international military officials were not able to confirm that the ISAF tactical directives 
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applied to these forces, given their different command structure. ISAF officials noted that 
these forces follow all of the tactical directives in practice, including reporting incidents 
like suspected civilian casualties immediately.  
 
Some night raids are reportedly CIA operations. Though likely not constituting the 
majority of night raids, there is zero public accountability over CIA conduct during raids.   
 
In addition, it has been more difficult to raise concerns regarding night raids because of a 
strong presumption by ISAF and U.S. officials that these raids are accurate and effective. 
Because they are confident that night raid targeting has improved, ISAF and U.S. 
officials have shown a tendency to disbelieve allegations of civilian casualties. For 
example, after a night raid in May 2010 in Surkh Rod, Nangarhar, inquiries by the 
Afghan government, the UN, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission 
(AIHRC), and Human Rights Watch all concluded that this had been a case of mistaken 
identity, which had led to the deaths of nine civilians. ISAF and U.S. officials steadfastly 
rejected these claims, and continued to view the raid as a success. It is troubling that in 
instances like this, separate and unanimous inquiries by so many credible organizations 
are not sufficient to challenge ISAF’s internal assessments, which too often appear to rely 
upon their own officials rather than interviews with eyewitnesses. 
 
Because of the overall lack of transparency over these night raids, when those involved in 
civilian casualty incidents or other misconduct are disciplined, these responses rarely—if 
ever—are publicly acknowledged. The result is a perception of impunity for the entire 
practice, if not for international forces as a whole.  
1. Compensation less common for night raids than other operations 
While the payment of compensation in cases of civilian harm has become more prevalent 
overall in Afghanistan, compensation for victims of night raids is still uncommon. In 
most cases, payment of compensation (more commonly referred to as “condolences” or 
“ex gratia” payments because they are non-binding) in Afghanistan still depends on the 
civilian who was harmed raising a complaint.
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 Those subject to night raids are often too 
afraid to request compensation. They may not be able to identify those troops involved in 
order to make a complaint given the lack of transparency about night raids and the special 
forces conducting them. The lack of any formal standards for compensating wrongful 
detention, and a sort of “presumption of guilt” by ISAF when it receives requests from 
night raids victims also hinder compensation in these cases. Perversely because ISAF has 
become more accurate in selecting its targets, and minimizing harm, it appears to have a 
presumption that most claims stemming from night raids are false. 
E. “Kill” rather than capture missions still the minority 
The Open Society Foundations’ and The Liaison Office’s interviews suggest that the 
primary aim of most night raids still appears to be search and seizure, although some 
purely “kill” missions do occur.77  Several military officials confirmed that there are 






Under international law, combatants may be lawfully killed or captured, provided all 
other IHL provisions are respected in doing so. However, given the difficulty of 
determining who is a civilian and who is a combatant in Afghanistan, repeated problems 
with mistaken intelligence, and the lack of transparency over how night raids are 
authorized, “kill” rather than “capture” missions raise additional concerns.79    
Afghan Government & Community Concerns 
Night raids bring the conflict into people’s homes like no other military tactic. Even 
when conducted with greater restraint, they are incredibly invasive and traumatic for 
those subjected to them. Both the Afghan government and Afghan communities have 
repeatedly called for an end to night raids altogether. However, failing that, they have 
argued that Afghans should at least have greater control and input over night raids. The 
Afghan government has argued that the lack of Afghan control of these raids is a 
violation of their sovereignty. They have also argued (together with Afghan 
communities) that better coordination and Afghan input would reduce mistaken targeting 
and improve cultural sensitivity. 
 
Afghans have long complained that the offensiveness of night raids is compounded by 
cultural sensitivities, especially entering the sanctity of women’s quarters and the 
searching of women by men.
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 These intrusions may be even more insulting when carried 
out by foreigners. Afghans have frequently suggested that Afghan troops would be more 
attuned to cultural and religious sensitivities. (That said, there may be hostility when the 




In response, tactical directives and other operational changes have attempted to involve 
greater Afghan government input into approval processes, and to address many of these 
cultural sensitivity issues. These reforms have had mixed results, in large part because 
ISAF has only made efforts to address the way that night raids are authorized and 
conducted, while ignoring the more significant Afghan request to limit or cease night 
raids altogether.  
A. Mixed results in improving Afghan input and control 
A number of the tactical and operational changes since the beginning of 2010 have 
attempted to address Afghan government complaints that they lack control and input into 
night raids. Afghan commanders are now part of the so-called “coordination cells” at 
Bagram Air base and at Kandahar Air Field that must sign-off on all night raids.
82
 Afghan 
commanders and officials in these cells are often given as much as 24 hours notice of the 
operations that will take place on a given night and are allowed to review the specific 
plans for each night raid. They may either veto the raid entirely or demand modifications 
to the operational plan, for example, if they assess that aspects of the plan will increase 
risk of civilian harm or outrage.
83
 Once the plan for a night raid is approved, Afghan 
commanders within this coordination cell are charged with informing a relevant regional 
Afghan official—typically the governor of the province. In some cases (though not all) if 
the governor can not be reached, or does not approve the raid, it has been called off.
84
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Additionally, Afghan forces are present in the vast majority of night raids, and lead at 
least 25 percent of the raids, a figure likely to increase with transition to Afghan forces.  
 
While these steps suggest improvements in cooperation, Afghan officials have not been 
satisfied. Senior Afghan officials, including the Afghan National Security Council and 
President Karzai, have repeatedly argued publicly that this level of consultation still does 
not give them any meaningful input over whether raids are conducted and if so, when, 
where, and how they are done.
85
  Given the unpopularity of night raids among the Afghan 
public, some of these objections may be public posturing. It would be politically 
unpopular for Afghan officials to openly support night raids.  
 
On the other hand, there are also legitimate reasons why Afghan officials might feel that 
these reforms do not meaningfully respond to their requests for input and control. 
Although 25 percent of the raids may be “Afghan-led,” all night raids are initiated 
through the same international forces-dominated target selection process. Thus, this 
reform does little to impact overall control of the number of raids or authorization of any 
given raid. The coordination cells at Bagram and Kandahar Air Field do allow a limited 
number of pre-vetted Afghan officials to be involved in authorizing or vetoing night 
raids. However, it is notable that these officials do not have input into the initial 
development of those plans or selection of targets, and they often have less than 24 hours 
to respond, with access to little information beyond what is presented to them by ISAF. 
There are also signs that Afghan officials involved in the approval process may feel 
unduly pressured, such that their “consent” to a raid is not entirely voluntary. ISAF told 
the Open Society Foundations that when they called Afghan governors to notify them 
about the raid, the governors often deliberately avoided the calls, suggesting they did not 
freely take responsibility for the decision.
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 Finally, local officials—those who are most 
susceptible to anger from affected communities—are rarely notified in advance through 
the current process, much less given any approval or veto rights. 
B. Local outreach and information sharing still needed 
While top-level coordination has improved somewhat (if not to the extent that the Afghan 
government wants), there is still much to be done in the area of community outreach. 
Afghan communities have argued frequently that greater consultation with local 
leaders—both official and unofficial—would improve accuracy, ease tensions with local 
communities, and result in the more peaceful capture of insurgent suspects. At a 
minimum, communities demand more open channels of requesting information following 
a raid, to find out the justification for the raid or the location of those detained.  
 
A provision in the January 2010 tactical directive suggested that international forces 
leave information behind at the site that would allow communities to find out about those 
who were detained, or request the return of confiscated property. However, this was not 
made mandatory until December 2010, and as a result was not widely implemented.
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The Open Society Foundations have periodically collected or reviewed these information 
sheets when they have been left behind: sheets reviewed by the Open Society 
Foundations have often been illegible or blank. In many cases, interviewees said no 
information was left behind. Perhaps as a result, communities have persistently 
 24 
 
complained to the Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office that they had no 
way to raise complaints or find out about those detained. 
 
Ad hoc outreach practices by commanders at a local level may have addressed some 
community requests for greater consultation. For example, some commanders and 
communities reported that jirgas, or community meetings, were held following a 
controversial night raid to explain what had happened—a generally positive step. 
 
In a few cases, community elders told the Open Society Foundations and The Liaison 
Office that international forces coordinated closely with local officials or community 
leaders in planning a raid. For example, two elders from the Dira Wot district of Uruzgan 
province said that at the beginning of 2010, night raids caused significant anger in the 
community but as of February 2011, the U.S. military had begun consulting with a local 
jirga about individual suspects before conducting a raid.
88
 The elders claimed this 
coordination improved raid accuracy and reduced community complaints.  
 
Another farmer from the Panjwai district of Kandahar province interviewed in March 
2011 said that international military had recently begun to bring Afghan police or 
community elders with them on raids, and that this had reduced the frequency of bad 
information.
89 
 He also noted that the better cooperation enabled families to get 
information on those detained, which was also a positive step for the community.  
 
In the few areas where local communities were more broadly consulted—either before or 
after the raid—the Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office received reports of 
better accuracy and conduct during the raids. In contrast, in areas where local 
coordination appeared to be absent, the Open Society Foundations and The Liaison 
Office continued to hear many of the same complaints about lack of coordination leading 
to intelligence errors. This suggests that local outreach may be an important factor in 
itself in addressing resentment toward these raids.  
C. Other Afghan community concerns: Fewer complaints about treatment of 
women, appreciation of greater Afghan force presence 
The last two tactical directives have also tried to address broader Afghan community 
critiques that night raids offend Afghan culture and religion
90
 having foreigners search 
homes without permission, having men search women’s quarters or women, using dogs 
(which many consider to be unclean animals). 
 
One key response to these critiques has been to require broader Afghan participation in 
night raids, a reform that appears to have been largely implemented.
91
 Many witnesses 
reported that Afghan forces were present on raids, and said the level of conduct was more 
respectful to Afghan culture because of this presence. One local researcher noted that the 
presence of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) side-by-side with international 
military during raids helps diffuse civilians’ anger, “They [ANSF] show their sympathy 
with the people. They decrease the hostility that people feel.”92 A landowner from 
Nangarhar whose home had been subject to a night raid in 2009 said, “Now these 
operations are performed by ANA [Afghan National Army], ANP [Afghan National 
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Police], and NDS [National Directorate of Security]. They have better conduct and they 
ask first if they can come in.”93 Others suggested that Afghan soldiers were better at 
identifying and separating those who needed special care—women, children, the elderly, 
or those who were sick or disabled.  
 
Troops have also reportedly taken more care to separate women and children from men 
on these raids. Occasionally, Female Engagement Teams—all-female teams of 
international forces—are deployed to search women’s quarters and/or speak to women.94 
In interviews conducted for this report, fewer Afghans complained about the disgrace to 
women than in previous research periods, suggesting a significant improvement. 
However, none noted the presence of female soldiers. 
 
The tactical directives also introduced a policy requirement that troops do a “soft knock” 
or a “call-out” at the beginning of each raid. This was designed to give the individuals an 
opportunity to come out peacefully and reduce the impression of “breaking and entering.” 
ISAF claims that this happens in every single raid, however, Afghans reported hearing a 
call-out in only a few of the cases that the Open Society Foundations and The Liaison 
Office investigated, suggesting room for improvement either in making this practice more 
consistent or in doing it in a way that Afghans notice and appreciate.  
 
In response to Afghan complaints that the use of dogs causes offense, the tactical 
directive limited some of the ways that dogs can be used, without eliminating their use 
during raids altogether. Civilians still report the presence of dogs, which sometimes cause 
injury or property damage, and nearly always cause extreme outrage.  
1. No “blank check” for Afghan forces 
Though the greater integration of Afghan forces on night raids responds to Afghan 
requests and thus is an overall improvement, this does not mean that using Afghan forces 
on these raids should have a “blank check,” as noted in the last report by Open Society 
Foundations and The Liaison Office.
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 In research for both the previous report and this 
one, there have been persistent complaints about Afghan forces stealing property, 96 or 
committing abuses themselves during night raids. Afghans continue to request that 
Afghan forces be the ones to carry out raids, but demand that when they do engage in 
night raids, there be greater accountability for their actions.  
 
To the Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office’s knowledge, there have been 
no specific efforts to ensure Afghan forces’ accountability in the context of night raids, 
and ANSF accountability more broadly remains weak.
97
 Interviewees have frequently 
requested that international forces make more efforts to ensure that Afghans involved in 
night raids are held accountable.  
 
Afghans also criticize the lack of accountability of irregular militias participating in night 
raids. In their previous report, the Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office 
noted that complaints about misconduct and lack of accountability were most frequent 
with so-called “campaign forces”—the name Afghans tended to give to informal militias 
used as force enablers for military or intelligence officials. Though there are fewer 
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reports of “campaign forces” on night raids, their use has likely not disappeared. With the 
development of more government-backed irregular forces including ad hoc groups 
supported by the intelligence services, or more formal programs such as the Afghan 
Local Police (ALP), a broader range of armed groups may now be engaging in raids, 




The informal nature of these militias and private security companies has meant that they 
are even harder to hold accountable when abuses occur. The same is true of the more 
recently created ALP.
99
 These forces tend to work very closely with U.S. Special 
Operations Forces, which can mean they are perceived by local communities (and 
sometimes the national police) as being “untouchable” on account of this association.   
D. Failure to seek alternatives to night raids  
Many Afghan communities, the Open Society Foundations, The Liaison Office, and 
human rights organizations, have argued that rather than trying to make night raids more 
palatable, ISAF should focus on finding alternative detention practices wherever possible. 
Daytime detentions, more closely resembling regular law enforcement procedures, would 
seem particularly appropriate for areas of the country in which the Afghan government 
maintains full control and access.  
 
ISAF maintains that commanders must note whether alternatives are available when they 
request authorization for a night raid.
100
 However, when the Open Society Foundations 
asked military officials on multiple occasions to give an example of an alternative, they 
could not. ISAF officials involved in reviewing requests for night raids have admitted 
that few requests to conduct a night raid are ever rejected, possibly suggesting the level of 
scrutiny is not that high. In some cases, witnesses or international forces have reported 
waiting until the first break of dawn or call to prayer—a day raid in name only.  
 
ISAF officials argue that night raids are preferred because detaining someone during the 
day increases the chance of violent resistance either from the targeted individuals or from 
surrounding community members, all of which might lead to a firefight or other violence 
that might harm troops and civilian bystanders alike.
101
 Though violent resistance in the 
daytime is possible, ISAF has presented no evidence that this has happened in the past, 
despite requests. The Afghan National Police and National Directorate of Security arrest 




Many of those interviewed maintained regular, public profiles—some with significant 
contacts in the Afghan government or military—and likely could have been detained 
peaceably through other means. In two of the most high profile examples of this, two Al 
Jazeera journalists were detained in two separate night raids in September 2010.
103
  ISAF 
alleged that the journalists had crossed the line in their role as journalists by not just 
talking with insurgents (which many journalists do) but by helping them. Al Jazeera 
argued that even if ISAF questioned their activities, ISAF did not need to subject the 
families of both men, including women and young children, to full-force night raids. Both 
journalists had press passes that were registered with ISAF and gave them access to 
military bases, which they periodically visited for press conferences or when requested to 
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by ISAF press officers or other liaisons. As the journalist detained in Ghazni province 
explained, “I have travelled with American forces to every district. Sometimes 
[international troops] call us for minor things, and we go even though it’s risky to be seen 
going to the PRT [“Provincial Reconstruction Team,” an international civil-military 
base].” He said that if they had called him to come in and talk with them, “I would be 
very happy to go. Even in the night, I would still go.”104  
  
Failure to explore whether there are other, less intrusive means for detaining someone
105
 
is often incomprehensible to the many Afghans who find their lives devastated by these 
night raids. In another raid in Ghazni province in November 2009 documented by 
journalist Anand Gopal, two civilians were killed and two were detained in a night raid 
targeting a government employee, whom the family maintains could easily have been 
brought in through a regular detention procedure in the daytime: “Did they have to kill 
my cousins? Did they have to destroy our house?” one of the family members asked. 
“They knew where Rahman worked. Couldn’t they have at least tried to come with a 
warrant in the daytime? We would have forced Rahman to comply.”106 
1. Legal concerns: IHL requires identification of less harmful alternatives  
 Under international humanitarian law (IHL), all feasible precautions must be taken—in 
both planning and implementation phases—to avoid or minimize harm to civilians.107 An 
attack in which the expected civilian loss would be disproportionate to the military 
advantage gained is unlawful and must be canceled or suspended.
108
 When there is a 
choice of military objectives, the objective selected should be the one expected to cause 
the least civilian casualties.
109
  Collateral harm to civilians is possible in any type of 
detention operation, of course, whether taking place in the daytime or at night. However,  
if an action that is less harmful to civilians than a night raid is possible without excessive 
loss of military advantage or risk to soldiers, then such means should be adopted.  
 
There are also important considerations under human rights law, which continues to 
apply during periods of armed conflict, though the exact inter-relation with international 
humanitarian law is not clear.
110
 At the very least, human rights law provides important 
guidance particularly for the arrest and detention of civilians during internal armed 
conflict, including the current conflict in Afghanistan, or other military operations 
conducted where the force has effective control, such as during belligerent 
occupations.
111
  In such cases—operations akin to law enforcement actions—human 
rights law may be binding, and require alternative tactics, ROEs, and different standards 
for the use of force. 
 
While there may be some situations in which no other detention mechanism is available, 
the fact that in many cases simple alternatives—for example, calling the Al Jazeera 
reporters to come on base, as they regularly did—were not even explored raises legal 
questions of whether ISAF, or more often special operations forces, are systematically 
ignoring their obligation to avoid or minimize harm to civilians during night raids. 
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E. Consequences to ignoring larger Afghan demands to limit or end night raids 
Despite significant steps to try to address concerns by the Afghan government and public, 
Afghan attitudes toward night raids are still overwhelmingly negative. In part, as 
illustrated above, this is because some objectionable practices have been under-
addressed. The Afghan government does not think reforms to authorization processes 
have gone far enough. Afghan communities are troubled that elements of night raids they 
have long objected to—the invasion of their privacy by foreigners, the use of dogs, the 
inability of families to find out what happened to loved ones—remain the same.  
 
However, a more significant explanation for persistent negative attitudes is not the 
ineffectiveness of these smaller operational and tactical tweaks, but the larger failure on 
the part of ISAF and U.S. forces to seek alternatives to night raids. Until this underlying 
issue is resolved, even perfect compliance on all issues that cause cultural and religious 
friction would likely not win Afghan public approval of night raids. Forgoing the use of 
dogs, or searching Afghan women with international women are inarguably better than 
the past, and may result in fewer specific complaints. However, they are not a substitute 
for Afghans’ larger preference that night raids be used only as an exceptional measure.  
 
The Afghan government, too, has a dramatically different view of night raids from its 
international partners. The level of hostility from senior Afghan government officials, 
including President Karzai, has reached new heights. Criticism of the use of night raids 
punctuates Afghan official overtures to the United States, both in public and private. This 
is partly out of frustration with continued coordination failures, but also reflects more 
broadly the government’s declining support for the U.S.-led military strategy, as they call 
instead for greater pressure on Pakistan to deny insurgent safe havens and a search for 
political solutions. In this context, the high public cost of night raids becomes much more 
difficult for Afghan leaders to justify.  Marginally more control or input into the 
authorization process for night raids does little to address Afghan government concerns 
that the centrality of night raids to the current military policy is taking them in a direction 
that they fundamentally do not agree with. 
Conclusions & Recommendations 
Since February 2010, when the Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office 
published an initial study on night raids, the tactical and operational changes contained in 
the two tactical directives and other interim guidance have addressed many Afghan 
objections to night raids. Conduct during the night raids has improved, reducing civilian 
casualties, abuse at point of capture, and severe property destruction. Target selection is 
more accurate. Afghan forces are better integrated into night raids, to some extent 
addressing concerns about cultural violations and misunderstandings. Reports of night 
raids disturbing women are down.  
 
While these improvements are significant, the costs of night raids have metastasized and 
the benefits (in the form of decreased insurgent attacks) have yet to materialize.
112
 The 
dramatic increase in the number of night raids, and evidence that night raids or other 
operations may be more broadly targeting civilians to gather information and intelligence, 
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appear to have overwhelmed Afghan tolerance of the practice. Afghan attitudes toward 
night raids are as hostile as ever, if not more so. Anger over night raids obscures not only 
substantial efforts to improve night raids practices, but overall recognition that ISAF and 
U.S. forces have made efforts to reduce civilian casualties and address Afghan concerns.  
The issue stymies efforts to build Afghan trust and confidence in the international-
community backed Afghan government, at both a local and national level.  
 
This issue has risen to a strategic level, seriously undermining long-term U.S. relations 
with the Afghan government. President Karzai has repeatedly lashed out at international 
forces in public, calling for an end to night operations or attacks on Afghan homes, and 
likening international forces to invaders rather than allies.
113
 President Karzai reportedly 
views this as a key sovereignty issue, and the cessation of night raids, or at least greater 





The benefits of the current night raids campaign is difficult to assess from a public 
standpoint given the lack of transparency. U.S. and ISAF military officials suggest night 
raids have been the most successful tactic in the last year, and that absent the ability to 
continue them, insurgent attacks would increase significantly. However, no evidence has 
been offered to support these assertions, and despite the surge in night raids, insurgent 




Yet even assuming the gains are as reported, the current pace of night raids is not 
sustainable given the extreme opposition by both the Afghan public and the Afghan 
administration. The tactical and operational changes to night raids practices made in the 
last year—though significant—have not been able to counter dissatisfaction with the 
practice as a whole. While militant extremist groups pose an enormous threat to human 
rights and security in Afghanistan, the human, political, and strategic costs illustrated by 
this policy review raise questions about whether a heavy reliance on night raids is the 
most effective long-term strategy for effectively countering that threat.  
  
Recommendations to ISAF and U.S. Forces 
 
1. Cease raids that do not discriminate between combatants and civilians; ensure that 
night raids, which are military operations, are only used against combatants or 
civilians directly participating in hostilities. 
 
2. Ensure that night operations—in particular mass detention operations at night— 
target individuals based on their presumed status as a combatant, rather than 
based on their age, gender, nationality, ethnicity, tribal affiliation, or the 
geographic area in which they live. 
  
3. Ensure night raids and other night-time military operations are not used as 
substitutes for criminal proceedings or other methods of intelligence gathering. 
Ensure that operations that aim to detain non-combatants adhere to law 
enforcement standards governing the use of force. 
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4. Implement tactical directive guidance to consider alternative methods of detention 
wherever possible.  Detentions that adhere to regular law enforcement practices 
are preferred in areas where there is strong government control, or other areas in 
which Afghan partners have strong capacity to conduct more regular law 
enforcement detentions.  
 
5. Continue to enforce existing guidance on night raids that have resulted in reduced 
civilian casualties and improved conduct.  
 
6. Improve outreach and consultation with local communities to the extent possible, 
before and after night raids.  
 
7. Improve transparency over the criteria for when night raids may be used (as 
opposed to other means of detention) and over the conduct of night raids 
themselves. Reinforce accountability measures, including ways for families to 
find out information about those detained, and the status of investigations into 
allegations of civilian casualties. 
 
8. Improve compensation standards and procedures with regard to night raids, 
including compensation for wrongful detention.  
 
9. Work with ANSF to improve their conduct and accountability, in particular with 
Afghan Special Forces, whose role in night raids may become more prominent 
after transition. 
 
10. Ensure that Afghan militias or other irregular forces are not used in night raids 
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